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Abstract  
 
As the EU’s political powers expand, so do concerns about its impact on the traditions and 
identities of the member states. The prediction is that parties will try to capitalize on such 
concerns and compete over this cultural dimension of European integration. Collective 
identities will become decisive if and when political parties cue voters to perceive national 
identities as incompatible with European integration. Yet most extant research focuses on the 
effects of parties’ general stance toward European integration, while the specific content of 
partisan massages remains unexplored; in consequence, we know little about if and how 
parties deliberately mobilise collective identities for or against European integration. By 
disaggregating party positions on Europe, this paper seeks to explore more closely to what 
extent parties appeal to national and European identities. Drawing on party manifesto data 
from the Euromanifestos Project (EMP), I examine the salience and determinants of national 
and European identity mobilization by national political parties in the EU 15 over the period 
1979-2009. The empirical analysis finds only little evidence for an increase in the salience of 
national and European identity mobilization with on-going EU integration. Patterns of identity 
mobilization are shown to vary as a function of parties’ ideological positions and political 
opportunities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
How and to what extent are collective identities mobilised in the context of European 
integration? We have good reason to expect that national political parties play a key role in 
this respect.  
Since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the European Union has 
increased in depth and scope, yet support for the integration project among citizens  in the 
member states has not always followed suit (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Mikhaylov and 
Marsh 2009). In light of the apparent ‘constraining dissensus’ of public opinion (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009) the future of EU integration will depend on whether or not political elites 
succeed in gaining popular support for a growing number of EU policies. Within the nation 
state, policy-makers can normally rely on a shared ‘sense of community’ (Easton 1965, p.185), 
or collective identity, which facilitates political cooperation and lets the individual agree to 
collectively binding decisions even if these go against her immediate preferences. Whether 
EU citizens already share a similar sense of (European) community is open to question; 
ultimately, however, a common European identity will be indispensable if citizens in the 
member states are to accept that collectively binding decisions, and in particular decisions 
with redistributive consequences, are taken at the supranational level rather than domestically. 
The need for a common European identity thereby arises at a time when the European Union 
affects citizens more and more in their everyday lives, thus fuelling concerns for member 
states’ cultural traditions and national identities (McLaren 2004). For these reasons, group 
attachments and questions of collective identity are expected to become more important for 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
Public opinion and political attitudes do not form in a void, however. Research on 
opinion formation and issue framing shows the potential of political elites and mass media to 
sway public opinion. Political parties are among the most prominent sponsors of such issues 
frames (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for an overview of the concept of framing and 
framing effects; Zaller 1992). Following this logic, identity considerations gain greater 
influence on attitudes towards EU integration if and when they are mobilised by political 
parties (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2005; 2009). 
Elite-mass linkages in EU opinion formation have been previously explored by 
authors assessing the influence of party elites on citizens’ attitudes towards EU integration 
(Franklin et al. 1994; Ray 2003; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Steenbergen et al. 2007). The 
present analysis, in contrast, takes one step back and looks more closely at the party-side of 
the connection. That is, we are interested in the contents of party messages on EU-related 
 - 4 -
issues rather than the effects of these messages on attitudes towards EU integration. The aim 
is to explore if political parties engage in identity mobilisation in the debate over EU 
integration. The relevance of this question becomes clear if we reconsider one of the central 
assumptions behind party effects on mass opinion towards the EU: parties are expected to 
drive the importance of identity considerations for EU support by emphasising the links 
between national identity, European identity, and EU integration, thus encouraging citizens to 
think about EU integration in terms of their identification with the national and European 
community. A thorough test of the assumption requires that we look not only at the effects of 
identity considerations on EU support at the individual level, but also at the salience of 
national and European identity at the party level. Extant research on the substantive contents 
of party contestation over Europe examined parties’ general stance on EU integration (e.g. 
Kriesi 2007), euro-critical party messages (e.g. Statham and Koopmans 2009), and references 
to specific policy areas and issues (e.g. Arnold and Pennings 2009; Pennings 2006). None of 
these analyses explores the specific salience of identity issues in party contestation. The 
present paper takes on this task by assessing to what extent parties highlight identity issues in 
their campaigns for European Parliament elections.  
Do parties deliberately raise the salience of national and European identities in the 
public? Do they address questions such as who belongs to the national community, who is 
part of the community of Europeans, what do members of each community have in common 
and what sets them apart from other collectives? In other words, do parties take up questions 
that likely bring national and European identity considerations to the top of citizens’ minds? 
These questions will be at the centre of the following analysis. Parties’ efforts to increase the 
salience of the national and the European community as object of identification in the wider 
public with a view to influencing opinion towards EU integration will thereby be referred to 
as identity mobilisation.  
As collective identities developed first within nation states, a popular assumption holds 
that parties will mobilise national identities against integration by framing the EU as a threat 
to the national community (De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kriesi et 
al. 2006). But while collective identities emerged first at the national level, the European 
Union now constitutes a political regime in its own right; as such, it forms an object of 
identification besides and above the national community and citizens in the member states 
have begun to identify with Europe (see, e.g., Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fuchs 
forthcoming; Marks 1999). Hence, it may be an equally viable strategy for parties to mobilise 
a common European identity with a view to generating support for the integration project. For 
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a complete picture of how identity considerations are mobilised in the context of EU 
integration we thus need to examine both, national and European identities. To this end, the 
present paper examines the salience political parties assign to collective identities at the 
national and the European level in the run-up to European Parliament (EP) elections. The 
following questions are explored:  
 To what extent do political parties engage in mobilising national or European identities?  
 Have parties increased their efforts to mobilise national and European identities as the 
European Union has developed a genuine political structure in the wake of Maastricht?  
 Which factors make parties more likely to either mobilise national identities or promote 
a collective European identity?  
Party positions on issues of identity are analyzed based on the contents of party manifestos for 
European parliament (EP) elections in Western Europe (EU15) over the period 1979 to 2009.  
Building on previous research, the paper first develops a typology of patterns of identity 
mobilisation by political parties in the context of European integration. The second part of the 
paper assesses to what extent issues of national and European identity have become more 
salient in partisan competition over time and which factors determine the type of identity 
political parties predominantly promote. A concluding section discusses the implications of 
identity mobilisation for the integration project. 
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2. Identity as an issue in political conflict in past research on party 
positioning on EU integration  
 
The present analysis of identity mobilisation by political parties builds on extant work on 
party positioning on EU integration and the dimensionality of the European political space. In 
contrast to previous work, however, we will narrow down the focus of analysis to identity 
issues as a distinct element of party positioning on EU integration.  
Building on cleavage theory, the bulk of the literature on party positioning in the EU 
context assesses whether EU integration leads to new structural conflicts with potential for 
political exploitation, or, rather, is linked to existing dimensions of domestic political conflict 
(Hix 1999; Kriesi 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Empirical 
analyses show that European integration not only pits opponents and defenders of economic 
liberalization against each other, but also creates tensions between cultural liberalists and 
advocates of national culture and sovereignty (Gabel and Hix 2004; Hooghe et al. 2002; 
2004). This line of reasoning ties in with research considering EU integration as part of  larger 
processes of globalization and denationalisation which intensify economic, political, and 
cultural competition between and within nation-states (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2008). The conflict 
over Europe thus has both an economic and a cultural dimension with the latter becoming 
more important for political competition over time (Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2006; 
2008).  
Concerns for (national) identity are discussed as part of the cultural dimension of 
political conflict over EU integration; given their overall focus on the potential of EU 
integration as a new line of conflict, however, these analyses provide little empirical findings 
regarding the salience of identity issues in political contestation specifically. The lack of 
empirical studies of identity mobilisation by political parties stands in contrast to the ‘key 
importance’ (Kriesi et al. 2006, p.929) for political mobilisation that is attributed to identity 
issues in the theoretical debate. Two points in particular require further elaboration: first, 
more work is needed on the actual content of parties’ appeals to collective identities.1 Second, 
previous analyses mostly concentrated on how political parties mobilise national identity 
considerations against EU integration and, in particular, on the role of radical right-wing 
                                                 
1 Public opinion research on EU integration has previously discussed identity mobilisation by political parties as 
an example of partisan cueing. However, the contents of so-called party cues with regard to collective identities 
appear underspecified. Extant analyses of cueing effects operationalise party cues either by parties’ general 
stance on European integration as measured by expert ratings (Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Steenbergen et 
al., 2007), by the presence of right-wing parties in a party system (Netjes and Edwards, 2005), or by a 
combination of both (de Vries and Edwards, 2009). However, a party’s general position on EU integration 
appears too crude a measure if we are interested in how parties frame the particular issue of identity and attempt 
to mobilise tensions between identity and integration.       
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parties in this regard. Yet the focus on national identity neglects the flip-side of identity 
formation in Europe, namely the emergence of a collective European identity. Claims that 
parties promote above all national identities require an analysis of the relative weight that 
parties give to identities at different levels – do parties describe attachments to the nation as 
irreconcilable with EU integration, thereby promoting the type of exclusively national identity 
that is thought to thwart popular support for the EU? Or do parties (also) appeal to 
identifications with the European community so as to generate support for EU integration? 
These questions require, first, a more thorough discussion of the concept of identity 
mobilisation, and, second, a discussion of the factors which make parties more likely to 
engage either in the mobilisation of national identity or the mobilisation of a collective 
European identity.  
 
To this end, the next section develops an operational concept of collective identity and 
identity mobilisation on which the empirical analysis will draw. A subsequent section 
formulates expectations with regard to patterns of identity mobilisation by political parties in 
the context of EU integration.  
 
3. Conceptualizing collective identities in the EU context  
 
Following Fuchs (forthcoming), the identity of a collective can be analysed at two ‘levels’: 
first, at the level of community, in terms of citizens’ subjective feeling of belonging together 
as a group with a common political structure and a common political fate (Easton 1965); 
second, at the level of the contents, in terms of shared beliefs regarding the criteria for 
defining and describing an individual’s membership in the group, the group’s common 
interest and experience, as well as the communalities shared by group members (Brewer 
2001; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). Social and political elites are expected to play a key 
role in defining these contents by generating and communicating specific ideas, news or 
symbols (Bruter 2003; Marcussen et al. 1999). Consensual representations of the community 
eventually become embedded in institutions, symbols and cultural understandings, and 
internalized by individual members through socialization processes, making collective 
identities relatively resistant to change (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Marcussen et al. 1999; 
Risse 2000).   
The beliefs and representations underlying collective identities are context-specific 
and can only be empirically assessed; in the case of collective national and European 
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identities, we would thus have to analyse the representations of national community 
established in each member state as well as the different representations of the European 
community, a task that is beyond the scope of this paper. In contrast, the present analysis 
approaches the question of identity formation from a slightly different angle. The objective is 
not to determine the specific contents of member states’ national identities and/or a common 
European identity, but how national and European identities gain salience among EU citizens 
and which role political parties play therein. I argue that it is possible to specify at a more 
abstract level which types of beliefs must be salient in a community in order to establish a 
common identity, and how political elites, and in particular political parties, are able to raise 
the salience of these beliefs among citizens. The assumption is that, in order to influence 
citizens’ identification with the national or European community, parties need to emphasise 
particular topics and convey messages of a particular type. In brief, rather than asking what it 
means, substantively, to be German, French, Italian or European, the central question is how 
political parties make the national and European collectives salient as political communities 
and objects of identification for citizens in the member states.  
 
Processes of collective identity formation and the mobilisation of identity for collective action 
have been studied extensively in social movement research (for overviews, see, e.g., Hunt and 
Benford 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow and McAdam 2000). I will use insights from 
this literature as a starting point for the analysis of identity mobilisation in the context of 
European integration.  
Collective identity formation in social movement research  
For social movement research collective identities are socially constructed and can be defined 
as the ‘shared representations of the group based on common interests and experiences’ 
(Brewer 2001, p.119; similar Taylor and Whittier 1992, p.172). Typically, these 
representations include shared norms, values and ideologies, common criteria for group 
membership as well as agreed upon definitions of the group’s boundaries (see, e.g., Brewer 
2001; Johnston et al. 1994; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). Collective identities are seen 
to result from the interrelated processes of boundary construction and the development of 
group consciousness (Hunt and Benford 2004; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000; Taylor and 
Whittier 1992; 1995). Boundary construction implies the designation of (putative) differences 
between members of the in-group and members of the out-group; the objective is to 
demarcate a particular group of individuals from others and create a sense of who group 
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members are – the ‘us’ or collective self – and who they are not – the ‘them’ or collective 
other (Hunt and Benford 2004). Group consciousness in the sense of an awareness of 
‘togetherness’ may stem from engagement in collective action on behalf of the group; 
potentially more important are framing processes which strengthen collective identities “by 
situating or placing relevant sets of actors in time and space and by attributing characteristics 
to them that suggest specifiable relationships and lines of action” (Hunt et al. 1994, p.185; see 
also Hunt and Benford 2004; Snow and McAdam 2000). While principally all members of the 
collective may engage in ‘identity talk’ (Hunt and Benford 1994), prominent social and 
political actors such as political parties, members of government, or movement leaders are 
likely to dominate framing processes via media appearances, political campaigning, public 
pronouncements and participation in public debates (Klandermans 1997; Snow and McAdam 
2000). For the individual, identity talk constitutes a ‘pool of collective beliefs’ (Klandermans 
1997, p.44) to draw on when considering issues of group membership, group boundaries and 
the norms and values shared by its members.  
 
How may the insights of social movement research inform the analysis of identity 
mobilisation by political parties in the context of EU integration? From a general point of 
view, we can infer from the above that a group’s collective identity will be stronger if the 
group’s boundaries and membership criteria are more salient among group members and the 
more members share an awareness of belonging together as a group with a common fate. 
With regard to the mobilisation of collective identity, we can infer that identity mobilisation 
takes place to the extent that political actors deliberately promote processes of boundary 
construction and the development of a common group consciousness. This implies, on the one 
hand, that political actors specify the group’s properties and define criteria for group 
membership so as to render the collective ‘us’ salient in the general public; on the other hand, 
political actors need to demarcate the collective ‘us’ from the collective ‘other’ so as to recall 
the in-group’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis those who have different values, beliefs, and practices 
and therefore do not belong to and potentially conflict with the in-group.  
Applying these conclusions to the context of EU integration, parties will increase the 
salience of collective national and European identities in the wider public by making citizens 
aware of the criteria for membership in the national and/or European group and demarcating 
the collective ‘us’ – be it national or European – from outsiders. The following section 
discusses in more detail how parties engage in mobilising national and European identity with 
a view to influencing public opinion towards EU integration.  
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Partisan mobilisation of collective identities in the context of EU integration  
The contentious relationship between collective identities at the national and European level 
and the implications of identity for EU integration provide opportunities for politicisation and 
political mobilisation. I expect parties to promote either a collective European identity or a 
strong national identity to legitimise or de-legitimise EU integration. Denouncing European 
integration as harmful to the national community is a way for parties to articulate a conflict 
between national identity and supranational integration and thus mobilise citizens against EU 
integration; on the other hand, portraying the European community as a distinct and desirable 
group is a way for parties to encourage citizens’ identification with the European level and, in 
turn, strengthen support for the European integration project.  
The two levels of political community co-existing within the European Union – 
national and European – make room for two strategies of identity mobilisation in the context 
of EU integration: first, mobilising national identity; second, mobilising a common European 
identity. Mobilising national identity entails a clear demarcation of the nation and the defence 
of the national ‘way of life’ against external influence, be it from Europe or other non-
members of the nation; the criteria for membership in the national community and the related 
affects and evaluations exclude feelings of belonging to the wider community of Europeans. 
Accordingly, national identity will be mobilised to the extent that parties emphasise the 
national community as a distinct group while downplaying the European community and 
depicting national attachments as incompatible with identifications with the community of 
Europeans. Likewise, national identity is mobilised when parties advocate the view that the 
common interests and experiences of the national community do not extend to and potentially 
conflict with those of the European collective and vice versa - you can either be a committed 
Brit or a committed European, but your identification with Europe will necessarily weaken 
your loyalty to Britain and vice versa. By promoting such an exclusive concept of national 
identity parties are able to appeal to citizens who see their position threatened by the 
integration process because they lack the necessary skills and resources to succeed in an 
integrated Europe. Often, these citizens have few sources for pride and self-respect other than 
the national community (Kriesi 2009). Exclusive conceptions of national identity allow 
parties to capitalize on these anxieties; by portraying the nation as a tight community with 
distinct qualities they can offer a refuge to those unsettled by the uncertainty of social and 
economic change coming with integration.   
By contrast, mobilising European identity implies highlighting the distinctiveness of 
the European collective while paying less attention to the national level. It requires parties to 
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set Europe apart in the global community, implying strict rules for membership in the 
community of Europeans in defence of a ‘European way of life’. European identity will be 
mobilised to the extent that parties promote a sense of belonging at the European level 
through references to a common ‘Europeanness’ and common experiences and interests 
which demarcate EU citizens from members of other collectives. A crucial question in this 
regard is the definition of group boundaries. Given that, by definition, the wider community 
of Europeans is inclusive of the populations of the member states, it is hard to conceive of the 
European collective as a community apart from and excluding the national communities. 
Consequently, an exclusive understanding of European identity does not necessarily entail a 
strict demarcation of the European collective from the national level; rather, it should be seen 
as an expansion of the idea of exclusive national identities to the level of the EU. As such, it 
primarily implies boundaries between the collective of EU members on the one hand and non-
EU member states on the other. I argued above that exclusive national identities hold promise 
for people who feel disadvantaged by the integration process. By the same token, highlighting 
the European community as a distinct group and promoting a European-wide identity is a 
means for parties to appeal to the beneficiaries of integration, i.e. those citizens who possess 
the necessary qualifications to compete on an integrated market and/or hold culturally liberal 
values that resonate well with the supranational project.  
 
So far, we ignored the possibility of multiple identities, that is, identifications with both the 
national and the European community. Following the above logic, mobilising multiple 
identities implies that parties at the same time emphasise the nation and Europe as objects of 
collective identification. To this end, national and European community would need to be 
portrayed as concurring rather than competing. We will not further explore the potential for 
multiple identity mobilisation, however, and concentrate on the two clear-cut cases of 
European identity on the one hand and national identity on the other. The decision to focus on 
the two distinct types of identity is based on the expectation that, for several reasons, parties 
will promote exclusive types of identity rather than multiple identifications: first, for parties 
seeking to capitalize on issues of identity to de-legitimise EU integration, it is easier to invoke 
a conflict between national identity and supra-national decision-making if the gap between the 
level of community (nation) and the level at which decisions affecting this community are 
taken (EU) is clear and unambiguous. Exploiting the conflict between identity and integration 
would arguably be harder if parties allowed for multiple identifications and encouraged 
feelings of belonging to both European and national communities. Likewise, parties seeking 
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to strengthen support for EU integration will likely focus on promoting feelings of belonging 
to the European community rather than appeal to national identities too as the latter may 
conflict with supra-national decision-making. What is more, parties have an interest to adopt a 
clear-cut position on issues of identity so as to deliver a coherent message to voters and 
distinguish themselves clearly from rival parties. Previous research shows that the effect of 
parties on voter position on EU integration is indeed greater when parties are internally united 
on the issue and take a clear pro- or anti-integration stance (Ray 2003). Finally, concentrating 
on the mobilisation of exclusive national or European identities appears justified from a 
methodological point of view: by focusing on the exclusive categories of identity as the 
‘extreme’ cases we provide a more rigorous test of claims that identity issues have become 
more important for partisan competition over EU integration than if we considered just any 
kind of reference to collective identity.  
 
4. Political parties and patterns of identity mobilisation  
 
A number of propositions can be formulated regarding patterns of identity mobilisation by 
political parties in the context of EU integration. Whether parties promote national or 
European identity is likely to vary as a function of parties’ ideological predispositions and 
strategic considerations as well as the specific contextual circumstances in which parties 
compete.  
A first set of expectations points to the ideological bases of national and European 
identity mobilisation by political parties. Mainstream political parties typically support 
European integration (Hix 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2002), yet take diverging 
positions regarding the economic and cultural dimension of the integration process (Helbling 
et al. 2010). Social democratic parties on the centre-left tend to criticise market liberalisation 
and economic integration for its negative consequences for social security and social justice; 
in line with the left’s international traditions, however, these parties can be expected to 
endorse the cultural dimension of integration. Similar arguments can be made for Green 
parties which are typically in favour of cultural integration (Helbling et al. 2010; Kriesi et al. 
2006). The overall support for the integration process by the centre-left and their generally 
positive view of the cultural dimension of integration leads us to expect that Social 
democratic parties and Green parties promote a collective European identity.  
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Hypothesis 1: Social democratic parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than 
national identity. 
Hypothesis 2: Green parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national 
identity. 
 
In contrast to the centre-left, right-wing parties tend to favour market liberalisation but are 
traditionally more concerned with the cultural and social integrity of the national community 
(Helbling et al. 2010; Kriesi 2007). Some variation is to be expected within the political right, 
however. More than any party family, Christian Democrats have been associated with the 
origins of European unification (Marks and Wilson 2000). This involvement makes them 
natural supporters of the integration process, typically taking an intermediate position with 
regard to both cultural and economic dimensions of EU integration (Kriesi 2007). For the 
same reasons, we expect Christian democratic parties to mobilise a collective European 
identity. Conservatives, on the other hand, are usually more weary of cultural integration as a 
result of nationalist factions and strong concerns for national sovereignty present within these 
parties (Marks and Wilson 2000). As a result, conservative parties are expected to mobilise 
national identity rather than a common European identity.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Christian democratic parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than 
national identity. 
Hypothesis 4: Conservative parties are more likely to mobilise national identity than 
European identity. 
 
As within the right, different currents can be distinguished within the liberal party family 
(Kriesi 2007; Marks and Wilson 2000). While generally supportive of market liberalisation, 
parties within the liberal camp tend to diverge with regard to their positions towards political 
and cultural integration; in effect, radical liberals are typically more favourable to the non-
economic dimensions of EU integration than their liberal-conservative counterparts (Marks 
and Wilson 2000). Given liberals’ general approval of supranational integration and the 
classic liberal heritage valuing social and cultural openness, they are likely to mobilise a 
collective European identity.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Liberal parties are more likely to mobilise European identity than national 
identity. 
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Parties at the extremes of the political spectrum are generally more critical of EU integration 
than the political mainstream, albeit for different reasons. Radical parties on the right 
typically frame their opposition toward EU integration in terms of a defence of the national 
community against immigrants and the social and cultural competition caused by the removal 
of national borders (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2007). Accordingly, they are highly likely to 
emphasise the national identity and clearly demarcate the national group from and within the 
wider European community. Opposition to the EU by the radical left, in contrast, is mainly 
based on economic grounds and the threat EU integration poses to social achievements within 
the nation state (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi 2007; Marks et al. 2002). These parties are 
expected to be more favourable to cultural integration, however, as a result of the left’s 
internationalist traditions and the EU’s potential to lower cultural boundaries (Helbling et al. 
2010; Kriesi 2007). As a result, we expect radical left-wing parties to promote a common 
European identity rather than national identity.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Parties on the extreme right are more likely to mobilise national identity than 
European identity. 
Hypothesis 7: Parties on the extreme left are more likely to mobilise European identity than 
national identity. 
 
A second set of expectations can be derived from parties’ political opportunities and their 
access to and participation in decision-making processes at the national and European level. 
With regard to parties’ overall stance on EU integration, parties with only limited access to 
the European decision-making process, i.e. opposition parties and sub-national party actors, 
have been shown to be more critical of EU integration than government parties which are 
directly involved in EU council negotiations and more easily gain access to EU institutions 
(Statham and Koopmans 2009). In a similar logic, we can expect government parties to 
promote a common European identity. Government parties participate in decisions at the EU 
level and need to ‘sell’ these decisions to the national electorate. Emphasising membership in 
a European wide community and promoting a common European identity thereby is a way of 
defending potentially contentious EU decisions domestically.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Parties in government are more likely to mobilise European identity than 
national identity. 
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Third, we might expect cross-national differences in party emphases on national and 
European identity issues. We thereby expect a kind of socialisation effect based on when a 
party’s country of origin joined the EC/EU. For the six original member states, the decision to 
join the European communities was closely connected to the objective of avoiding another 
war on the continent and to dampen any extreme form of nationalism in the future. Given this 
specific historic trajectory, we expect parties from these countries to be more likely to 
emphasise the European community dimension than parties from later accession countries 
where economic interests may have played a greater part in the decision to join the EC/EU. 
What is more, parties from the original member states have had more opportunities to 
participate in and adapt to the EU political system; as a result of their greater experience 
within the EU system, they are expected to put more emphasis on European identity building 
than ‘later-comers’ to the EU political process.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Parties from the six EC founding states are more likely to mobilise European 
identity than national identity. 
 
5. Data and operationalisation 
 
Party positions on issues of identity will be analyzed using national party manifestos for 
European parliament (EP) elections in fifteen EU member states2 for the period 1979 to 2009. 
Data on the relevant party manifestos has been provided by the Euromanifestos project (EMP) 
at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES).3 The Euromanifestos project 
codes manifestos of all parties which have been represented in the European parliament at 
least once. Overall, the data set used here includes information on 600 manifestos issued by 
209 national parties in the run-up to seven EP elections from 1979 to 2009.4  
 Manifesto data lends itself in particular to examining party positions on specific issues 
over time. Because manifestos are devised in extensive debate and negotiations within the 
party and usually are ratified by party conventions, these documents enjoy authoritative and 
representative status for party policy at the time of publication (Budge 1987). From a party 
                                                 
2  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.  
3 For more information on the EMP, see the project homepage at http://www.ees-homepage.net. For the 1979-
2004 manifesto studies see the documentation by Braun et al. (n.d.), Wüst and Schmitt (2007), and Wüst and 
Volkens (2003). For the 2009 manifesto study, see the PIREDEU project homepage at http://www.piredeu.eu 
and the documentation by Braun et al. (2010).  
4 By-elections in new member states, i.e. first elections after a country joined the EU such as in Sweden in 1996, 
have been omitted from the analysis.  
 - 16 -
perspective, elections manifestos help maintain discipline within the party by defining the 
official party line to which individual party members are expected to toe. From the 
perspective of the electorate, election manifestos are important indicators of parties’ political 
ideas and policy goals. This is true even if few people actually read electoral programmes 
themselves because the contents of manifestos are spread via the mass media, forming the 
basis for debate over parties’ policy proposals and questions raised with party candidates in 
the campaign. Research by the Manifesto Research Group provides evidence that party 
manifestos are indeed one of the major indirect influences on voters’ perceptions of what 
parties are standing for (Budge 1987). On this basis, manifesto data appears a fruitful source 
for assessing the extent of identity mobilisation by political parties: on the one hand, in terms 
of the contents of party competition, because given their representative status for parties’ 
programmatic orientation, we should observe an increase in references to issues of identity 
and related considerations in party manifestos if issues of identity have indeed become more 
important for political contestation in the EU context; on the other hand, with regard to the 
presumed effects of party competition, because if voters’ perceptions of party positions can 
indeed be traced back to manifestos, parties’ influence on the salience of national and 
European identity in citizens’ minds will also be a result of what parties say about these issues 
in their electoral programmes.   
 What is more, parties issue novel programmes ahead of each election making it 
possible to explore how the salience of identity issues for political parties has evolved over 
time and compare parties not only at any one election but also from one election to another. 
The potential for cross-temporal analyses is one of the major advantages of manifesto data 
over expert surveys of party placements which typically capture more long-standing 
ideological positions and appear less suited to observing dynamics in party positioning 
(McDonald and Mendes 2001). Given the prominent argument in the literature whereby 
parties’ attempts to mobilise collective identities have increased in recent years (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009), such a diachronic design appears particularly suited for the purpose of the 
present analysis.      
I analyze EP election manifestos rather than national electoral programmes as the 
former usually include more arguments related to issues of European integration, the 
European Union, and its policies and institutions (Wüst and Schmitt 2007). Hence, it is 
possible to assess the relative importance of identity considerations compared to other EU 
integration-related issues. What is more, with EP elections taking place simultaneously in all 
member states, parties issue their respective manifestos at roughly the same point in time; 
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thus, external conditions that may affect the salience of identity considerations, e.g. the debate 
on the Constitutional treaty or subsequent EU enlargement waves, can be held constant across 
countries. Analysing national parties’ manifestos rather than Euro-Party programmes for EP 
elections allows us to detect variation in the salience attached to specific issues in different 
domestic contexts.  
The Euromanifestos Project maintains the approach first developed by the Manifesto 
Research Group  (MRG; see, e.g. Budge 1987) in focussing on the emphasis parties put on 
different issues as manifested by the number of arguments devoted to these issues in their 
electoral programmes. It deviates from a ‘pure’ salience approach, however, by registering not 
only the sheer number of references to a specific issue in a manifesto, but also the direction of 
references by coding whether parties adopt a pro- or con-position on the issue in question. 
Moreover, the EMP includes additional coding categories to capture parties’ positions on 
European issues in more detail than the original MRG framework. Finally, the EMP coding 
scheme is ‘mirrored’ for different levels of government to determine whether a statement has 
an explicit focus on the party’s country (national level), Europe or the EU/EC (supra-national 
level), or neither as the relevant political arena or political protagonist.5 Overall, the EMP 
coding scheme contains 170 different categories grouped into seven major policy domains 
(for details on the EMP coding scheme see Braun et al. 2010; Wüst and Volkens 2003; Wüst 
and Schmitt 2007).  
Manifesto data has mainly been used to determine party positions on the Left-Right 
dimension (see e.g. contributions in Budge et al. 1987; Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006). More recent studies also relied on manifesto data to determine party positions on 
European integration (Marks et al. 2007; Netjes and Binnema 2007; Ray 2007). By measuring 
party positioning on a single dimension ranging from support for national independence to 
support for further EU integration, these analyses confound party positions on economic, 
political, and cultural aspects of EU integration. Therefore, these measures cannot be used for 
the purpose of the present analysis which seeks to assess whether parties (also) compete over 
questions of cultural traditions and collective identity that are separate from economic 
interests. Kriesi et al.’s analysis of the transformation of the national political space in the 
wake of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006) is one of the few studies investigating the 
components of the cultural dimension of political conflict over supranational integration; 
                                                 
5 The level of government is identified by two so-called meaning elements that may be part of an argument, 
namely the governmental frame (national government, EU/EC government, or world government/unspecific) 
and/or the policy scope (nation/sub-national entities, EC/EU/Europe, or world/unspecific). If only one meaning 
element is present, it defines the code; if both elements are present but do not suggest the same code, 
governmental frame beats policy scope (see Wüst and Volkens, 2003).  
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however, their measure for political mobilisation along the cultural dimension includes 
parties’ stances on a variety of issues, including post-materialist values, cultural and social 
liberalism, EU integration, and immigration and security policies (Kriesi et al. 2006, pp.932-
934). As a result, this measure is too broad to tap political mobilisation of national and 
European identities specifically.  
Given the lack of adequate measures in the literature, I construct a novel measure of 
identity mobilisation by political parties based on selected coding categories of the EMP data. 
Items have been selected by applying the insights of social movement theory discussed above 
to the empirical analysis of party manifestos. I thereby assume that while different ideas may 
be associated with the concepts of national and European identity in specific time periods 
and/or countries, there is a core set of arguments which underlie identity mobilisation more 
generally. The assumption is that if parties are to have an influence on citizens’ identifications 
and feelings of belonging to the national or European community, they need to emphasise 
particular topics and convey messages of a particular type. These are, on the one hand, 
messages which refer to and invoke an awareness of ‘togetherness’ or group consciousness 
among members of the community; on the other hand, messages which refer to and invoke the 
boundaries between the community and outsiders. Following this line of reasoning, it 
becomes possible to construct measures of national and European identity mobilisation which 
are sufficiently abstract to allow a comparison of parties’ attempts at identity mobilisation 
over different time periods and across EU member states.  
In this fashion, nine of the original 56 EMP coding categories have been retained to 
measure parties’ attempts at mobilising national and European identities; six categories from 
the domain ‘Fabric of society’ and two from the domain ‘Political system’. Table 2 indicates 
for each selected coding category which political arena (European or national) a manifesto 
statement refers to and whether it adopts a positive or negative position on the coded 
objective. The nine selected codes can be considered indicators for the mobilisation of a 
national or European identity in that they stand for the type of messages described above: they 
define criteria for membership in the national or European community and highlight the 
characteristics that are shared by national or European citizens (but not by others); in this 
way, these statements can be seen to promote an awareness of belonging together among 
national citizens or Europeans while at the same time, they call attention to the boundaries 
between the national or European community and other groups. Items are grouped, first, 
according to whether they emphasise the national community so as to mobilise national 
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identity considerations (upper half of table 1) or the wider community of Europeans, evoking 
a common European identity (bottom half of table 1). 
The upper half of table 1 lists codes which pertain to the mobilisation of national 
identities. 6  These are EMP Variables p1_601 (national way of life), p1_6021 (retaining 
national way of life in Europe), p1_608 (opposition to multiculturalism in country), and 
p1_606 (social harmony in country). Variables p1_601 and p1_608 are used as measures for 
the degree to which parties emphasise the dividing line between the national community and 
members of other groups: by promoting established national ideas (p1_601) and 
characterising the national community as a culturally homogenous group that requires 
foreigners to give up their religious, linguistic or cultural customs in order to assimilate with 
the host society (p1_608). Variables p1_6021 and p1_606, on the other hand, are used to 
measure the degree to which parties attempt to promote an awareness of togetherness and 
communality within the national community by emphasising the need to retain national 
customs in the process of EU integration (p1_6021) and calling for national efforts and 
solidarity (p1_606).  
The bottom half of table 1 lists the corresponding codes for the mobilisation of a 
collective European identity. Variables p2_601 (European way of life) and p2_608 
(opposition to multiculturalism in Europe) are used to measure the degree to which the 
European community is characterised as distinct from other groups, with a unique way of life 
and proper cultural traditions to which newcomers must adopt. Variables p2_302 (opposition 
to decentralisation of the EU), p2_3021 (support for the transfer of powers to the European 
level), and p2_606 (social harmony in Europe), on the other hand, are used as measures for 
the degree to which parties promote a European consciousness among EU citizens, namely by 
calling for a united Europe (p2_302) that enjoys sufficient competencies to act collectively 
(p2_3021) and whose members show their solidarity with the European community (p2_606).  
By combining items referring to the national community on the one hand and the 
European community on the other, I construct measures of party positions on national and 
European identities so as to assess which types of identity are mobilised by different parties, 
in different countries, and at different points in time. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to 
establish whether the theoretical differentiation between national and European identity 
mobilisation is in fact empirically tenable. This is the focus of the following section.  
                                                 
6 In order to account for differences in the length of party manifestos, the EMP variables used here do not 
represent raw counts of the number of times a specific code has been used in a manifesto, but the share of 
arguments (in percentages) coded into a given category compared to the total number of arguments in a 
manifesto.  
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Table 1: Constructs and indicators of party positioning on national and European identity  
Construct/ Indicators     
 EMP Var # Governmental frame EMP Domain EMP Code Direction Descriptiona 
National identity 
 p1_601 National Fabric of society  National way of life positive Appeals to patriotism/nationalism; support for 
established national ideas 
 p1_608 National Fabric of society  Multiculturalism in country  negative Support for enforcement or encouragement of 
cultural integration in manifesto country 
 p1_606 National Fabric of society  Social harmony in country  positive Appeals for national effort and solidarity in 
manifesto country  
 p2_6021 Europe Fabric of society  Retaining national way of 
life in Europe 
positive Emphasis on need to retain national way of life and 
national cultures in Europe or the EC/EU  
European identity  
 p2_601 Europe Fabric of society European way of life positive Appeals to European way of life, the Occident, or 
Western Civilisation  
 p2_608 Europe Fabric of society Multiculturalism in EU  negative Support for enforcement or encouragement of 
cultural integration in Europe, the EC/EU 
 p2_606 Europe Fabric of society Social harmony in EU positive Appeals for a common effort and solidarity in 
Europe, the EC/EU  
 p2_302 Europe Political System Decentralization of EU  negative Support for more unitary Europe and more 
Europeanisation 
 p2_3021 Europe Political System Transfer of power to EU positive Support for transfer of power and competences to 
the EC/EU 
a Description of codes correspond to the descriptions provided in the original Euromanifestos coding scheme (see Braun et al. n.d.). 
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Dimensions of identity mobilisation in party manifestos 
Our theoretical expectation is that political parties adopt a clear-cut position on identity issues 
and seek to mobilise either a collective national or a collective European identity. Accordingly, 
EMP coding categories were identified theoretically as indicating either a strategy of national 
identity mobilisation or a strategy of European identity mobilisation. I conduct explanatory 
factor analysis to establish whether national identity items on the one hand and European identity 
items on the other indeed hang together. The expectation is that parties jointly emphasise either 
national identity categories or European identity categories resulting in high correlations among 
national identity items on the one hand and high correlations among European identity items on 
the other (but low correlations between national and European identity items). The results of the 
explanatory factor analysis are reported in table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Dimensions of party positions on issues of national and European identity  
  Components 
Constructs and indicators 1 2 3 4 
National identity     
p1_601 National way of life (positive) .726    
p1_608 Multiculturalism in country (negative) .805    
p1_606 Social harmony in country (positive)   .772  
p2_6021 National way of life in Europe (positive)   .772  
European identity     
p2_601 European way of life (positive)    .859 
p2_608 Multiculturalism in EU (negative) .412   .572 
p2_606 Social harmony in EU (positive)  .677   
p2_302 Decentralisation of EU (negative)  .787   
p2_3021 Transfer of power to EU (positive)  .458   
Note: Principal component analysis with varimax rotation; explained variance: 56 %; blanks indicate loadings <0.3;      
 N=600, constructs and indicators refer EMP variables and codes with direction of codes in parentheses; for a 
description of the coding categories see table 1. 
Source: Euromanifestos 1979-2009  
  
Overall, four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00 are extracted. Two of these (components 
one and three in table 2) reflect concerns related to the national community while the other two 
(components two and four) reflect issues pertaining to the European community. The first 
‘national’ factor (component one) is composed of support for the national way of life and 
opposition to multiculturalism within the country while the second (component three) is 
composed of support for social harmony in the country and the conservation of the national way 
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of life within Europe. Referring to the European level, one factor (component two) is composed 
of the three items social harmony in Europe, opposition to decentralisation of the EU, and 
support for the transfer of competences to EU institutions while the other one (component four) 
combines support for a European way of life and opposition to multiculturalism in Europe.  
The results of the factor analysis show that parties not only distinguish between issues 
related to the national community on the one hand and the European community on the other; 
rather, a further differentiation is made between cultural and socio-political aspects of national 
and European community. Concerning cultural aspects of identity mobilisation, we observe 
notable parallels between national and European levels. Both times, one factor is extracted that 
reflects demands for internal cultural homogeneity and the predominance of established national 
or western ideas. Given the emphasis on cultural integration into the host society, be it national 
or European, we term these factors ‘national cultural protectionism’ (component one) and 
‘European cultural protectionism’ (component four) respectively. The relatively high loadings of 
the item ‘opposition to multiculturalism in Europe’ on the first factor can also be interpreted in 
this light. Parties advocating cultural homogeneity at the national level appear to extend this 
position to the European community. This is plausible if we think of Europe as synonymous with 
a cultural sphere - ‘the Occident’ - to which the fifteen EU member states analysed here 
historically belong. The two remaining factors (components two and three) both reflect socio-
political concerns, but with distinct focuses at the national and European level. Given the 
emphasis on national solidarity and the defence of the national way of life in Europe, component 
three will be termed ‘national societal autonomy’; in contrast, component two more strongly 
reflects political aspects with an emphasis on a stronger political union (Europeanisation) and 
European-wide solidarity. It will therefore be termed ‘European political unification’.  
 
In line with our initial expectation, parties can be distinguished in terms of emphases on issues 
related to national and European identity, making the differentiation between national and 
European identity mobilisation in party campaigning plausible. The following section turns to 
the empirical analysis of the salience parties attach to issues of national and European identity in 
political conflict and assesses the scope of national and European identity mobilisation over time 
and for different member states and party families. Given that more than two dimensions have 
emerged in factor analysis, we start by examining the different aspects of identity mobilisation in 
the context of EU integration separately. To this end, we construct four additive scores based on 
the components derived above. In addition, total national and European identity scores are 
constructed aggregating all four variables referring to the national community and all five 
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variables referring to the European community respectively. Thus, two sets of three indices each 
will be used in the following analyse: the first three indices, termed ‘national cultural 
protectionism’, ‘national societal autonomy’ and ‘total national identity’, are constructed from 
the four variables capturing concerns for the national community (upper half of table 1); the 
second set, termed ‘European cultural protectionism’, ‘European political unification’, and ‘total 
European identity’, are constructed from the five variables capturing concerns for the European 
community (bottom half of table 1). 7  Thus, the salience of national identity and its sub-
dimensions as an issue in political conflict is defined by the total share (in percentages) of a 
party’s manifesto dedicated to questions of national community; likewise, the salience of 
European identity and its sub-dimensions is reflected by the total share of a party’s manifesto 
dedicated to questions of European community.  
 
6. Empirical findings  
 
The following section provides empirical evidence on the extent to which political parties engage 
in national and European identity mobilisation and the types of collective identity prevailing in 
different countries and among parties from different ideological families. It further analyses 
whether identity mobilisation by political parties is related to parties’ ideological position, 
participation in government, and the length of time their country of origin has been a member of 
the European community. We start with a descriptive account of the salience that parties have 
attached to issues of collective identity since the first direct elections to the EP in 1979. A second 
part analyses which factors make parties more likely to mobilise national or European identity 
respectively.  
The salience of national and European identity mobilisation in party manifestos  
The first objective of this paper is to compare the relative salience of identity-related issues for 
party competition in EU member states. Over the whole period under analysis, national political 
parties appear to devote comparatively little space to issues of national and European identity in 
their EP election manifestos (see table 3).  
 
                                                 
7 ‘national cultural protectionism’ is the additive score of  EMP variables p1_601 and p1_608; ‘national social 
autonomy’ is the additive score of  EMP variables p1_606 and p2_6021; ‘total national identity’ is the additive score 
of  EMP variables p1_601, p1_608 p1_606, and p2_6021; analogously, ‘European cultural protectionism’ is the 
additive score of EMP variables p2_601 and p2_608; ‘European political unification’ is the additive score of EMP 
variables p2_606, p2_302, and p2_3021; ‘total European identity’ is the additive score of  EMP variables p2_601, 
p2_608 p2_606, p2_302, and p2_3021.  
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Table  3: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by year (in percent) 
Year 
National identity  European identity  Total  Diff. 
No. of 
coded 
manifestos/ 
arguments 
National 
cultural 
protectionism 
National 
societal 
autonomy 
Total national 
identity 
 EU cultural 
protectionism 
EU political 
unification 
Total 
European 
identity 
 EU + national 
identity 
EU - national 
identity 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
 1979 0.8 2.0 0.2 0.8 1.1 2.3  0.9 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.6 3.7  3.7 4.3 1.5 4.5 38/ 12 889 
 1984 1.2 3.9 0.5 1.5 1.7 4.2  0.4 1.0 1.6 2.4 2.1 2.9  3.7 4.7 0.4 5.5 41/ 17 763 
 1989 0.9 2.6 0.9 4.3 1.8 5.5  1.3 3.3 1.0 1.8 2.3 3.8  4.1 6.7 0.5 6.7 63/ 21 513 
 1994 1.2 3.4 0.7 3.4 1.9 5.0  0.9 1.8 1.0 1.5 1.9 2.3  3.8 5.4 0.0 5.6 85/ 33 594 
 1999 0.6 1.5 0.6 2.3 1.2 2.8  0.7 1.6 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.6  3.3 3.5 0.9 4.0 114/ 38 555 
 2004 0.6 1.9 0.4 1.1 1.0 2.3  0.8 2.6 1.2 1.9 2.0 3.1  3.0 4.1 1.0 3.6 137/ 58 796 
 2009 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.1 1.0 2.1  0.6 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.2  2.8 3.1 0.8 2.9 122/ 58 885 
 Total 1979-2009 0.8 2.3 0.5 2.3 1.3 3.4  0.8 2.1 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.9  3.3 4.4 0.7 4.5 600/ 241 995 
Eta² .01 .01 .01  .01 .01 .01  .01 .01  
F 1.08 .56 1.06  1.15 1.51 .60  1.01 .73  
Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one year (all party manifestos combined). Total EU+national 
identity gives the additive scores of shares EU identity plus shares national identity. Diff. EU-national identity gives the subtractive scores of shares EU identity minus shares national identity in a 
party manifesto.  *=p < 0.05 **= p < 0.01 ***=p<0.001 
Source: Euromanifestos 1979-2009. 
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On average, about 3% of manifesto statements can be related to parties’ attempts at mobilising 
collective national or European identities with appeals to a common European identity (2.0%) 
exceeding attempts to strengthen national identities (1.3%). The overall salience of identity 
issues thereby has remained fairly stable over time, reaching a peak of 4.1% in 1989 and 
decreasing to 2.8% in the last election campaign 2009. Similarly, the space devoted to the 
mobilisation of national and European identities respectively has seen only minor fluctuation, 
with concerns for national identity being most salient (1.9%) in 1994 while party support for a 
common European identity was most significant in 1979 (2.6%). Overall, these initial findings 
provide little support for claims that on-going political integration at the EU level has been 
reflected by a new focus on a non-economic dimension of political conflict related to issues of 
group membership and associated values. The fact that the salience of identity issues in party 
manifestos is not significantly related to the time of the campaign also points in this direction.  
What is more, in all years under consideration, parties’ emphasis on the European 
community exceeds references to the national community (see second to last column on the right 
of table 3). Remarkably, however, parties emphasise different dimensions of collective identity 
depending on whether they refer to the national or the European community. At the national 
level, parties emphasise cultural unity over national autonomy while we observe the inverse 
pattern at the European level: here, parties predominantly emphasise political unification over 
cultural homogeneity (see the first two columns for national and European identity respectively). 
Thus, while relying on demarcation along cultural lines when mobilising national identity, 
parties accentuate the political dimension of the European community when mobilising a 
common European identity.  
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Table 4: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by party family affiliation and government incumbency (in percent)  
 
National identity  European identity  Total  Diff. 
No. of 
coded 
manifestos/ 
arguments 
National 
cultural 
protectionism 
National 
societal 
autonomy 
Total national 
identity 
 EU cultural 
protectionism 
EU political 
unification 
Total 
European 
identity 
 EU + national 
identity 
EU - national 
identity 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Party family                    
 Greens 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.8  0.2 0.4 1.6 2.2 1.8 2.3  2.1 2.5 1.5 2.4 57/ 38 651 
 (Post-)Communist 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.3  0.2 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.4  1.4 1.8 0.5 2.0 70/ 29 194 
 Social Democrats 0.6 2.1 0.4 1.1 1.0 2.7  0.6 0.9 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.0  3.1 3.3 1.2 3.4 121/ 48 993 
 Liberals 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.8  0.4 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.1  2.3 2.3 1.6 2.2 69/ 28 653 
 Christian Democrats 0.8 1.6 0.5 1.4 1.3 2.1  1.0 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.0 3.7  4.3 4.0 1.7 4.4 73/ 21 721 
 Conservatives 0.4 1.3 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.7  0.8 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.0  2.6 2.6 0.9 2.7 48/ 22 184 
 Nationalist 4.4 5.1 1.5 2.6 5.9 6.4  2.4 5.1 0.4 1.1 2.8 5.2  8.7 8.3 -3.0 8.2 30/ 6 891 
 Agrarian parties 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7  0.0 0.1 2.3 4.2 2.4 4.2  2.8 4.4 1.9 4.2 7/ 2 389 
 Regional parties 1.5 3.4 1.3 5.3 2.7 6.1  1.6 3.5 0.8 1.1 2.4 3.9  5.2 6.7 -0.3 7.7 86/ 30 060 
 Special interest 0.4 1.2 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.9  0.5 1.4 0.3 1.1 1.0 1.8  2.1 2.6 -0.1 2.6 39/ 13 259 
Eta² .17*** .03* .14***  .08*** .07*** .05**  .15*** .06***  
F 13.10 2.07 11.02  5.45 5.27 3.16  11.37 4.28  
Incumbency                  
 Government party 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.4  0.9 2.5 2.1 2.5 3.0 3.5  3.8 4.1 2.3 3.3 143/58 606 
Eta² .01 .00 .01  .00 .06*** .04***  .01* .13***  
F 2.25 .29 2.33  1.12 26.53 18.07  5.53 6.01  
Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for the same party family (all years combined). Party family labels 
and classification of parties into party families follow EMP coding and are based on the founding period of the party (see Braun et al. n.d., p.49). Parties are classified as “parties in government” if 
they participated in the national government in the legislative period during which EP elections took place or, if national and European elections took place on the same date, in the legislative period 
prior to EP elections. Information on government incumbency for 2009 taken from the EES 2009 Contextual Data, Advance Release, 16/05/2010 (see www.piredeu.eu and the documentation by 
Czesnik et al. 2010). Information on other years taken from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (see parlgov.org and the documentation by Döring and Manow 2010).  *=p < 0.05 
**= p < 0.01 ***=p<0.001 
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Looking at parties by ideological orientation, the results reported in table 4 confirm some of our 
initial expectations: overall, identity mobilisation is most prevalent among nationalist and 
regional parties followed by Christian Democrats and Social Democratic parties (see column 
total EU + national identity in table 4). As expected, with 5.9% of all statements, issues of 
national identity have the greatest salience for nationalist parties while issues related to European 
identity are most salient for Christian Democratic parties (3.0%). Remarkably, however, 
nationalist parties also come second in terms of the salience of the European community in party 
manifestos followed by agrarian and regional parties. Comparing the relative salience of national 
and European identity for individual party families, Greens, Social Democrats as well as Liberals 
and Christian Democrats all put more emphasis on a common European identity, in line with our 
initial expectations. To a lesser extent, this is also true for conservative parties which we initially 
expected to highlight national identity over a common European identity. At the national level, 
parties emphasise both dimensions of identity mobilisation more or less equally, the exception 
being nationalist parties which clearly highlight the cultural boundaries of the national 
community. These parties, and to a lesser extent regional parties, further extend cultural 
demarcation to the European level, putting more emphasis on European cultural homogeneity 
than political unity (2.4% to 0.4%). For all other party families, in contrast, the political 
dimension of unification prevails in European identity mobilisation. Overall, parties’ ideological 
stance in terms of party family affiliation thus appears to have a significant influence on the 
salience of both national and European identity issues in a party’s manifesto.  
Government parties too show the expected pattern (see bottom of table 4): with a clear 
dominance of issues related to the European community in their election manifestos, they appear 
to opt for the mobilisation of a common European identity rather than encouraging strong 
national identities. This observation is corroborated by the measures of association listed at the 
bottom of table 4 which a significant association between government incumbency and the 
mobilisation of (the political dimension of) European identity whereas there is no significant 
relation between government parties and national identity mobilisation.  
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Table  5: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by enlargement waves (in percent)  
Country groups by year 
of EC/EU accession 
National identity  European identity  Total  Diff. 
No. of 
coded 
manifestos/ 
arguments 
National 
cultural 
protectionism 
National 
societal 
autonomy 
Total national 
identity 
 EU cultural 
protectionism 
EU political 
unification 
Total 
European 
identity 
 EU + national 
identity 
EU - national 
identity 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
 Original six members 0.9 2.5 0.8 3.1 1.6 4.2  1.1 2.7 1.5 2.1 2.6 3.4  4.3 5.4 1.0 5.4 297/ 134 570 
 1973 enlargement  0.7 2.4 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.6  0.1 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.7  2.0 2.9 0.2 2.9 147/ 45 793 
 1981/1986 enlargement  0.8 2.0 0.5 1.4 1.3 2.6 
 0.8 2.2 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.3  2.8 3.2 0.1 3.2 93/ 44 955 
 1995 enlargement  0.3 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1  0.6 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.4  2.9 2.6 1.7 2.6 63/ 16 677 
Eta² .01 .01 .01  .04*** .04*** .05***  .05*** .01*  
F 1.02 2.51 2.61  7.37 8.42 11.54  9.98 2.64  
Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one country group. Country groups: Original six members: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Luxemburg; 1973 enlargement: Denmark, Ireland, UK; 1981/1986 enlargement: Greece, Portugal, Spain; 1995 enlargement: Austria, Finland, Sweden. 
*=p < 0.05 **= p < 0.01 ***=p<0.001  
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Turing to our expectations whereby parties in countries that joined the European community 
earlier in the process are more likely to promote a common European identity, our hypotheses 
are only partly confirmed. Parties in the original six EC member states generally attach the 
greatest salience to issues related collective identity and, with 2.6% of all statements, they also 
devote the most space to European identity issues specifically (see table 5). Remarkably, 
however, parties in Austria, Finland, and Sweden (1995 enlargement) come second in terms of 
the space given to the promulgation of a common European identity (2.3% of party manifestos) 
and even exceed the original members in terms of the relative salience given to European 
identity compared to national identity issues in party manifestos. In light of the parallels between 
parties from the original EC member states and parties from the latest enlargement wave, there is 
no clear-cut evidence of socialisation effects due to longer experience within the EU system 
which we expected to make parties more inclined to European identity mobilisation. This rather 
heterogeneous picture is reflected at the country level, too (see table 7 in the appendix). Among 
the countries where parties pay most attention to issues of collective national and European 
identity, we find old and newer member states as well as large and smaller countries 
(Luxembourg: 5.4% of all statements related to issues of collective identity; Belgium, France: 
4.7%; Austria: 4.2%; Italy: 4.1%; Germany: 4.0%; Finland: 3.7%). Attempts at mobilising a 
common European identity thereby appear particularly salient in smaller member states (parties 
in Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg devote on average 3.7% of their manifestos to statements 
invoking a common European identity vs. 1.6% in Germany, 1.3% in France and 0.6% in the 
UK) while national identity mobilisation is most pertinent in two of the largest member states, 
France (3.4%), and Germany (2.4%). Together with the UK, these are also the countries where 
national identity mobilisation clearly exceeds attempts at mobilising a common European 
identity while the reverse is true for Austria, Belgium, and Italy8. As to the different dimensions 
of national and European identity, national cultural protectionism is most salient in Germany 
(1.8%), Portugal (1.7%) and the UK (1.3%) while French parties stand out for their emphasis on 
national societal autonomy (2.3%). At the European level, Italian, Belgian, and Spanish parties 
in particular define the European community in cultural terms (1.9%, 1.6%, and 1.4% 
respectively) whereas emphasis on European political unity is highest among parties from 
Luxembourg 3.1%), Austria (2.5%), and Finland (2.3%). Overall, these results seem to indicate 
that particularities of the respective national context have a greater influence on collective 
                                                 
8 The difference between shares of arguments devoted to European identity and shares devoted to national identity is 
-2.0 for France, -1.4 for Portugal, -1.0 for the UK, and -0.8 for Germany. In contrast, the difference is +3.3 for 
Austria, +2.7 for Belgium, +2.3 for Italy, and +1.9 for Luxembourg.  
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identity mobilisation by political parties within a country than socialisation into EU decision-
making processes over a longer time horizon as a result of early EC/EU accession.  
Explaining the salience of national and European identity mobilisation  
The descriptive analysis and measures of association discussed so far indicate that parties’ 
engagement in mobilising national and European identities is primarily related to their 
ideological stance as indicated by party family affiliation, the national context parties compete 
in, and, in case of EU identity mobilisation, parties’ participation in government and, to some 
extent, the length of EC/EU membership of parties’ country of origin. Using multiple regression 
analysis, the following section seeks to assess the relative impact of each of these factors while 
controlling for the other explanatory factors. To this end, we estimated seven models (see table 
6): one for the overall salience as well as the salience of each dimension of national and 
European identity in party manifestos respectively (models 1 to 6 in table 6) plus an additional 
model testing the likelihood that a party devotes more space to issues of European identity than 
to national identity in its manifesto (model 7 in table 6). Models 1 to 6 were estimated using OLS 
regression with the share of arguments falling in the respective category as the dependent 
variable. Model 7 is a logistic regression model with “dominant identity in party manifesto: 
European identity” as the dependent variable, coded 1 if the share of arguments related to 
European identity exceeds the share of arguments related to national identity in a party 
manifesto, and coded 0 otherwise. Because party manifestos are clustered within member states 
and election years, standard errors were corrected to avoid bias. As independent variables, we 
include government incumbency during the EP election campaign, parties’ ideological stance 
(party family affiliation), and time of EC/EU accession of a party’s country of origin. All 
predictor variables are dichotomous variables coded 1 if the party issuing a manifesto falls in the 
respective category and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 6: Explaining identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos  
 
National identity  European identity  Dominant identity: 
“European” 
(7) 
National cultural 
protectionism 
(1) 
National societal 
autonomy 
(2) 
Total national 
identity 
(3) 
 EU cultural 
protectionism 
(4) 
EU political 
unification 
(5) 
Total European 
identity 
(6) 
 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.  Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.  Coef. s.e. 
Government incumbency  
Government party -.13 .13 -.07 .08 -.19 .15  .21 .27 .74** .20 .95** .33  .47 .33 
Party ideology (reference category: Social democrats)  
Greens -.44** .17 .01 .15 -.43 .24  -.45* .17 .22 .31 -.22 .36  -.03 .63 
(Post-)Communist -.38 .20 .01 .12 -.37 .26  -.17 .24 -.51* .20 -.68* .28  -.59 .48 
Liberals -.39* .16 .06 .10 -.33 .20  -.23 .19 -.05 .26 -.28 .33  -.30 .56 
Christian Democrats -.10 .18 .33 .24 .22 .29  -.09 .15 .52 .38 .42 .38  -.37 .61 
Conservatives -.25 .18 .18 .14 -.07 .24  .46 .27 -.69** .22 -.24 .32  -.42 .61 
Nationalist 3.03** .67 .99* .42 4.01** .78  2.65 1.64 -1.08* .44 1.57 1.53  -2.74** .62 
Agrarian parties -.12 .25 .10 .13 -.02 .28  -.49* .20 .86 1.48 .37 1.42  -1.35 1.01 
Regional parties 1.48* .66 .17 .20 1.65* .71  1.47* .57 -.33 .27 1.14 .64  -.93 .62 
Special interest -.23 .34 .14 .25 -.09 .44  .18 .30 -1.08** .26 -.91 .35*  -2.08* .81 
Time of EC/EU accession (reference category: original six member states) 
1973 enlargement  .15 .26 -.28** .10 -.13 .27  -1.17** .24 -.30 .29 -1.47** .39  -.75 .38 
1981/1986 enlargement  -.08 .30 .15 .22 .08 .42  -.76* .29 -.61* .26 -1.37** .34  -.76 .56 
1995 enlargement  -.04 .14 -.10 .10 -.14 .16  -.56* .27 -.04 .36 -.59 .52  .31 .58 
Constant  .50** .18 .29** .10 .78** .21  .98** .20 1.49** .20 2.47** .26  2.25** .40 
R² .19 .07 .20  .17 .13 .14  .11 
N 433 433 433  433 433 433  354 
Note: Entries for national identity and European identity models are OLS estimates with robust, cluster-corrected standard errors. Entries for “dominant identity: European” are logistic regression 
estimates with robust, cluster-corrected standard errors. The R2 for “dominant identity: European” is McFadden’s pseudo-R2.  *=p < 0.05 **= p < 0.01  
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Overall, government incumbency, parties’ ideological orientation, and the length of EC/EU 
membership explain a comparatively small proportion of the variance of the salience of national 
and European identity issues in party manifestos. While we can account for about 20% of the 
variance in salience attached to national identity, the above factors only explain 14% of the 
variance in European identity mobilisation. For both the national and the European level, the 
model thereby performs better for the cultural dimension of identity mobilisation than the 
second, socio-political dimension (19% and 17% explained variance to 7% and 13 % 
respectively).  
Parties’ ideological stance proves most influential for the salience parties attach to 
national and European identity in their manifestos. Compared to social democratic parties, the 
reference category, nationalist parties – and to a lesser extent regional parties– are significantly 
more likely to promote national identities, and demarcate the national community culturally as 
well as in terms of societal autonomy. Inversely, and in line with our expectations regarding their 
overall support for cultural openness, Greens and Liberals are significantly less prone to cultural 
protectionism at the national level; for Green parties, this effect also extends to the European 
level. Regarding European identity mobilisation, we observe the expected negative effect for 
Conservative parties, albeit only for the political dimension of EU identity mobilisation.  
As hypothesised, government incumbency proves influential for mobilising a European 
identity and in particular for EU identity mobilisation in terms of emphasis on the need for 
European political unification. We further find confirmatory evidence for the socialisation 
hypothesis, observing that parties from countries which joined the EC/EU at a later stage 
generally attach significantly less salience to EU identity issues in their election manifestos than 
parties from the EC founding states. This difference is significant for all three accession waves 
for the cultural dimension of EU identity mobilisation whereas for the political dimension of EU 
identity mobilisation we find statistically significant effects only for parties from the Southern 
European countries (1981/1986 enlargement).  
 
Contrasting these results with a view to our initial hypotheses, we can infer the following: The 
first two hypotheses postulating a greater likelihood of centre-left parties to mobilise European 
identity are only partly confirmed. While are not necessarily more likely to mobilise European 
identity, Greens in particular are significantly less likely than parties from other ideological 
families to mobilise national identity along cultural lines. Similarly, we do not find the expected 
positive effect of Christian democrats on European identity mobilisation (hypothesis 3); 
Conservatives, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to mobilise European identity, 
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albeit, inversely, a conservative background does not have a significant positive effect on 
national identity mobilisation, so that hypothesis 4, too, is only partly confirmed. In contrast, we 
find sound evidence for hypothesis six referring to parties on the extreme right of the political 
spectrum: nationalist parties are significantly more likely to mobilise national identity and have a 
significant negative effect on (the political dimension of) European identity mobilisation; in 
effect, the odds of nationalist parties to predominantly mobilise national identity in their 
manifestos are about 15 times higher than the odds of Social Democrats to attach more salience  
to national identity issues rather than a common European identity. The picture is less clear for 
parties on the extreme left: while overall, a radical left-wing position has a negative rather than 
positive effect on European identity mobilisation, this effect pertains primarily to the political 
dimension of EU identity building while there we observe no effect on the cultural dimension, 
providing only partial support for hypothesis seven. Finally, we find sound evidence for 
hypotheses eight and nine: both government incumbency and origins in one of the six EC 
founding states have the predicted positive effect on the salience of European identity in parties’ 
manifestos.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper set out to assess the extent to which parties attempt to mobilise national and European 
identities in the context of on-going political integration in the EU. It set out from the assumption 
that identity considerations must be made salient for citizens in the member states if national and 
European identity are to become more important for public opinion towards the EU and that 
political parties are among the prime actors for making citizens aware of their collective identity 
and the national and European communities as objects of identification.  
 We examined party manifesto data over the thirty year period from 1979 to 2009 to 
assess the extent of national and European identity mobilisation empirically. The results of the 
analysis show that identity issues overall (still) have little salience in party programs, with 
European identity issues given comparatively more emphasis than national identity issues. 
Whether a party predominantly advocates national or European identity thereby is affected by its 
political opportunities in the EU decision-making process (government incumbency), its country 
of origin and the national historical experience with the EC (time of EC/EU accession) and, to a 
lesser extent, its position on the left-right dimension. Ideological factors thereby are particularly 
influential at the extremes of the political spectrum with nationalist parties being by far more 
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likely than any other party family to emphasise national identity over European identity. So far, 
these results provide only weak support for recent claims whereby parties increasingly engage in 
identity mobilisation to sway public opinion towards the EU. At least on the party side of this 
link between EU citizens and political elites, identity considerations appear to still have to gain 
in salience if collective identity really is to drive political conflict over EU integration.  
To bring the analysis full circle, however, these preliminary results ought to be combined 
with public opinion data so as to assess whether identity mobilisation by political parties has the 
expected effects on citizens’ collective identifications with Europe and the nation and, eventually, 
on citizens’ support for the EU integration project in general. Further research should thus 
combine contextual data on the salience of national and European identity in the national 
political conflict with individual data on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU so as to test whether 
there mass-elite link in collective identity construction postulated here can be empirically 
confirmed.  
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APPENDIX: Table  7: Salience of identity mobilisation in EP election manifestos by country (in percent)  
Country 
National identity  European identity  Total  Diff. 
No. of coded 
manifestos/ 
arguments 
National 
cultural 
protectionism 
National 
societal 
autonomy 
Total national 
identity 
 EU cultural 
protectionism 
EU political 
unification 
Total European 
identity 
 EU + national 
identity 
EU - national 
identity 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
 Austria 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5  1.2 2.1 2.5 1.9 3.7 2.5  4.2 2.6 3.3 2.5 17/ 6 003 
 Belgium 0.7 2.1 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.3  1.6 3.1 2.1 2.5 3.7 4.0  4.7 4.6 2.7 4.7 68/ 43 935 
 Denmark 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.3  0.2 0.5 1.6 2.1 1.8 2.3  2.1 2.5 1.4 2.8 56/ 10 790 
 Finland 0.6 1.5 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.7  0.4 0.6 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.6  3.7 2.8 1.6 3.4 22/ 4 200 
 France 1.0 3.2 2.3 6.4 3.4 7.2  0.8 1.9 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.2  4.7 7.4 -2.0 7.7 57/ 16 064 
 Germany 1.8 4.2 0.6 2.0 2.4 5.4  0.9 1.6 0.7 0.8 1.6 1.9  4.0 6.2 -0.8 5.3 44/ 26 471 
 Greece 1.1 2.8 0.9 2.3 1.9 3.4  0.1 0.3 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.5  3.0 3.2 -0.9 4.1 23/ 9 253 
 Ireland 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9  0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.1  1.2 1.3 0.4 1.5 30/ 12 222 
 Italy 0.3 1.2 0.6 1.6 0.9 2.0  1.9 4.3 1.4 1.7 3.2 4.6  4.1 5.4 2.3 4.5 50/ 14 902 
 Luxembourg 1.0 2.2 0.8 1.5 1.8 2.5  0.5 1.1 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.5  5.4 4.6 1.9 4.0 27/ 6 976 
 Netherlands 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.2  0.6 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.3 2.1  3.0 2.3 1.7 2.4 51/ 26 222 
 Portugal 1.7 2.3 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.0  0.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.9  3.3 3.3 -1.4 3.0 22/ 6 187 
 Spain 0.3 1.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.6  1.4 2.9 0.5 0.7 1.9 3.0  2.4 3.3 1.3 3.5 48/ 29 515 
 Sweden 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4  0.3 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0  1.1 1.2 0.7 1.0 24/ 6 474 
 United Kingdom 1.3 3.5 0.3 0.9 1.6 3.6  0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.9  2.3 3.6 -1.0 3.8 61/ 22 781 
Eta² .05* .07*** .07***  .08*** .17*** .14***  .07*** .13***  
F 2.04 3.19 3.31  3.52 8.37 6.77  3.35 6.01  
Note: Entries are percentage shares of arguments falling in the respective category relative to the total number of arguments coded for one country (all years combined). *=p < 0.05 **= p < 0.01 
***=p<0.001 
